The EU's Complicity in the Gaza Conflict: How the US Initiative Should Not Absolve Responsibility
The initial phase of Donald Trump's Middle East plan has elicited a collective sense of relief among EU officials. After two years of violence, the ceasefire, captive releases, partial IDF pullback, and aid delivery offer hope – yet regrettably, furnish a pretext for Europe to continue inaction.
Europe's Problematic Stance on the Gaza War
Regarding the war in Gaza, unlike Russia's invasion in Ukraine, European governments have displayed their poorest performance. Deep divisions exist, causing policy paralysis. More alarming than passivity is the charge of complicity in violations of international law. EU bodies have been unwilling to exert pressure on the perpetrators while continuing commercial, diplomatic, and defense cooperation.
The breaches of international law have sparked widespread anger among European citizens, yet European leaders have lost touch with their own people, particularly younger generations. Just five years ago, the EU spearheaded the climate agenda, responding to youth demands. Those same youth are now shocked by their government's passivity over Gaza.
Delayed Acknowledgement and Weak Measures
It took two years of a war that many consider a atrocity for several European nations including France, Britain, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg and Malta to recognise the Palestinian state, following Spain, Ireland, Norway and Slovenia's lead from the previous year.
Just last month did the European Commission propose the initial cautious sanctions toward Israel, including penalizing radical officials and violent settlers, plus halting European trade benefits. However, both measures have been implemented. The first requires unanimous agreement among 27 EU governments – unlikely given fierce resistance from nations including Hungary and the Czech Republic. The second could pass with a supermajority, but Germany and Italy's opposition have made it meaningless.
Divergent Responses and Lost Credibility
This summer, the EU found that Israel had violated its human rights obligations under the EU-Israel association agreement. However, recently, the EU's top diplomat paused efforts to suspend the agreement's trade privileges. The contrast with the EU's 19 packages of sanctions on Russia could not be more stark. On Ukraine, Europe has taken a principled stand for democracy and global norms; on Gaza, it has damaged its reputation in the international community.
The US Initiative as an Escape Route
Now, Trump's plan has provided Europe with an way out. It has enabled EU nations to embrace US requirements, similar to their stance on the Ukrainian conflict, defense, and commerce. It has enabled them to promote a fresh beginning of stability in the region, shifting attention from punitive measures toward European support for the American initiative.
The EU has retreated into its familiar position of taking a secondary role to the United States. While Middle Eastern nations are expected to shoulder the burden for an peacekeeping mission in Gaza, EU members are lining up to participate with aid, reconstruction, governance support, and frontier supervision. Discussion of leveraging Israel has virtually disappeared.
Practical Obstacles and Geopolitical Constraints
All this is comprehensible. The US initiative is the only available framework and undoubtedly the only plan with any chance, even if limited, of achievement. This is not because to the intrinsic value of the plan, which is problematic at best. It is instead because the United States is the only player with sufficient influence over Israel to effect change. Backing American efforts is therefore both practical for Europeans, it makes sense too.
Nevertheless, implementing the plan after its first phase is more challenging than anticipated. Numerous hurdles and catch-22s exist. Israel is unlikely to fully pull out from Gaza unless Hamas lays down weapons. But Hamas will not disarm completely unless Israel withdraws.
Future Prospects and Required Action
This initiative aims to transition toward local administration, first involving local experts and then a "restructured" governing body. But administrative reform means vastly distinct things to the Americans, Europeans, Arab nations, and the Palestinians themselves. Israel rejects the authority altogether and, with it, the idea of a Palestinian state.
Israel's leadership has been explicitly clear in restating its consistent objective – the destruction of Hamas – and has carefully evaded addressing an conflict resolution. It has not fully respected the truce: since it began, dozens of non-combatants have been fatally wounded by IDF operations, while others have been injured by Hamas.
Without the global community, and particularly the US and Europe, exert greater pressure on Israel, the likelihood exists that widespread conflict will restart, and Gaza – as well as the Palestinian territories – will continue being occupied. In short, the remaining points of the initiative will not be implemented.
Conclusion
This is why European leaders are mistaken to view support for Trump's plan and pressure on Israel as distinct or contradictory. It is politically convenient but practically incorrect to see the former as part of the paradigm of peace and the second to one of ongoing conflict. This is not the time for the EU and its constituent countries to avoid responsibility, or to abandon the first timid moves toward punitive measures and requirements.
Leverage exerted on Israel is the only way to overcome political hurdles, and if this is achieved, Europe can ultimately make a modest – but constructive, at least – contribution to peace in the Middle East.